This paper evaluates the effects of the earned income tax credit (EITC) on poor families' earnings. Exploiting state-level variation in EITCs, we find that the EITC helps families rise above poverty-level earnings, primarily by inducing labor market entry in families that initially do not have an adult worker. Evidence based on the federal EITC is less supportive of a positive impact of the EITC. Finally, based on the state-level EITC results, our findings suggest that for the range of policy changes typical of recent history in the U.S., the EITC is more beneficial for poor families than is the minimum wage.
INTRODUCTION
T he United States has in recent years relied on three types of policies to boost the incomes of poor families: the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the minimum wage, and welfare. Although welfare acts directly to provide income to many of the neediest families, and thus is perhaps the most immediate means of assisting the poor, concerns have been raised about the potential for longer-term dependency associated with pure income-support programs. Given these concerns, the principal attraction of both the EITC and the minimum wage is that they are intended to raise the earned income of the poor, a goal that is generally viewed as more desirable than making direct transfer payments to low-income families. However, most empirical research has focused on the impacts of the EITC and the minimum wage on other labor market behaviors-such as labor supply or labor demand-which although obviously related to income, provide only part of the overall picture. 1 In addition, previous studies have focused primarily on the effects of the programs on particular subgroups of the populationsuch as single mothers with children in estimating EITC effects, and teens or young adults in estimating minimum wage effects-rather than on the overall distributive effects among families participating in the program.
Moreover, those few studies that do examine the effects of the EITC (or the minimum wage) on family incomes have relied mainly on simulation methods to reach their conclusions, rather than on direct empirical estimates. Such studies, which tend to take parameter values from the empirical literature, might be adequate if there was a general consensus about the effects of these programs on labor market behavior. However, because much of the literature studying the behavioral influences of anti-poverty policies is contentious (e.g., the recent debate over the employment effects of minimum wages), the simulation results are likely to be viewed skeptically, especially by those with an alternative point of view regarding the assumptions underlying the simulation.
In this paper, we examine the empirical link between the EITC and earned pretax income using panel data on poor and low-income families that are the EITC's intended beneficiaries. Using data on federal and state parameters of the EITC program, we estimate the effects of the EITC on earned incomes of poor families and on transitions of families into and out of poverty. By using pre-tax (and therefore pre-EITC) earnings rather than total income, we obviously ignore an important component of the redistributive effects of the EITC. We choose to focus on pre-tax earnings for two reasons. First, it permits a direct comparison of our estimates for earnings with our complementary estimates of labor supply effects; when we find consistent results in both sets of estimates, it increases our confidence that the income effects we are estimating are related to the EITC. Second, in much of the discussion of potential anti-poverty policies, there is a stated preference for policies that encourage work and longer-run economic self-sufficiency; witness, for example, the recent emphasis on welfare reform and empowerment. The EITC is frequently praised along these same lines, reflecting an assumption that the credit encourages families to work more. Our aim is to provide some additional evidence with which to assess the accuracy of these claims, by looking at the EITC's effects on families' earned incomes. 2 Somewhat unexpectedly, the effects of the EITC identified from federal variation differ considerably from the effects identified from state variation. In particular, changes in the federal EITC are not associated with increases in the earnings of poor families, while the effects identified from state variation point to strongly beneficial effects. Each identification strategy has some strengths and weaknesses on a priori grounds. We find, however, that the pattern of estimated effects of the EITC on labor supply variables is more consistent with theoretical predictions when the state EITC variation is used, bolstering the plausibility of this identification strategy.
While the main contribution of the paper is this new evidence on the EITC, we also provide some contrasts with the effects of minimum wages on family incomes, building on some of our earlier work (Neumark, et. al., 1998) . Because we use pre-tax earnings, our estimates provide a very conservative test of the benefits of the EITC relative to the minimum wage. Although very much a reducedform approach, the resulting estimates of the effects of these two alternative poliincome directly is less demanding of the data, and of course we should not necessarily rule out wage effects of the EITC. 2 Another alternative is to focus on the effects of the EITC on consumption, as is done in Romich and Weisner (1999) , Smeeding, et. al. (1999) , and Barrow and McGranahan (1999) .
cies on earned income have three major advantages over the estimates from previous studies. First, our procedure allows the data to speak directly to the question of the efficacy of using either the EITC or the minimum wage as a redistributive tool, and circumvents the need to choose point estimates for behavioral parameters. Second, we can control for the influences of both policies (as well as other factors) on family income changes, avoiding estimates that might be biased as a result of focusing solely on one or the other policy. Third, by examining both federal and state policy, we are able to consider several types of variation in the data to help identify the effects on income. Based on the state-level EITC results, we find evidence of differences in how the EITC and minimum wage policy affect earnings. Both policies appear to have positive income effects on poor families with children. However, the EITC effects are larger, evaluated on the basis of the average policy changes of the past 15 years. Complementary evidence on employment and hours effects indicates that the benefits of the EITC come about mainly by inducing labor market entry for poor families without any adult workers prior to increases in the EITC. On net, these results suggest that the EITC is the more effective anti-poverty tool, especially if one considers positive work incentives as a goal of anti-poverty programs.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
As noted above, previous research on the economic effects of anti-poverty programs has often been limited to an explicit focus on estimating particular behavioral or labor market parameters that, by themselves, do not fully describe the impact of the programs on their overall policy goals. Even apart from this, the EITC has received less attention from economists than other programs because it is a relatively recent policy initiative. Although it was first implemented in 1975, the EITC was considered a relatively unimportant component of anti-poverty policies until it was expanded sharply as part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, effective in 1987; additional EITC expansions took place in each year from 1991 to 1996.
Because of the absence of data on individuals affected by the EITC, early studies of the effects on labor supply were usually based on simulation methods using parameters taken from the negative income tax literature or from more general studies of labor supply (Hoffman and Seidman, 1990; Dickert, et. al., 1995) . More recently, however, Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Rosenbaum (1999a and 1999b) have directly estimated the effects of the EITC on the labor supply of single women with children. Both papers find that the expansion of the EITC raised work activity among this group. In contrast, Eissa and Hoynes (1998) compute similar estimates for married couples and find that the EITC had a small positive effect on the labor supply of married men, but a larger negative effect for married women, with the net result being a decline in family labor supply.
In addition, comparisons of the EITC and minimum wage policy have been conducted using a simulation approach. The best-known study in this area is by Burkhauser, et. al. (1996) , who evaluate how well the minimum wage targets the poor and compare the amount of additional income received by such families with what would be provided by the EITC. The authors conclude that the 1990 and 1991 minimum wage increases stemming from the 1989 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act benefited upper-income families (income-to-needs over three) more than poor families, because many minimum wage workers are in higher-income families. In contrast, the increases in the EITC between 1989 and 1992 went nearly exclusively to poor and near-poor families with children. However, these simulations ignore both labor supply effects of the EITC and labor demand effects of minimum wages. While informative about the targeting of benefits, they are unlikely to be definitive about the ultimate effects of the alternative policies on income. In contrast, our analysis directly estimates the influence of the EITC (and minimum wage) on earned income using actual state and federal policy changes to identify the effects.
DATA
To conduct our analysis, we use data at the family level drawn from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) annual demographic files for the years 1986 through 1995. 3 As each family is potentially in the March sample for two consecutive years, we attempt to match records across years in order to observe changes in income during the period of our sample. Overall, the match rates were above 80 percent, although families with younger heads and lower income-toneeds ratios were somewhat less likely to be successfully matched. 4 For each family that could be matched across years, we extracted data on the amount and composition of family income, family size, and state of residence, as well as other variables introduced below. The income and family size data are then used to calculate an income-to-needs ratio for each family, based on the official poverty line for a given family size in each year. Note that the income data in the March CPS refer to the previous year, so that our sample period actually corresponds to the years 1985 to 1994.
To each of these family-year records, we appended the relevant data for the key parameters of the EITC program and the prevailing minimum wage in effect for the year in which the income data are reported. For the minimum wage, we used the higher of the federal or state minimum wage for each state and year, following existing practice in the minimum wage literature. For the EITC, we collected information on various parameters of the federal program applicable to each family based on the number of dependent children residing in the family; these parameters include the phase-in rate of the credit, the maximum income level to which the phase-in rate is applied, the income level at which the credit begins to be phased out, and the phase-out rate. In the empirical analysis, we use the phasein rate as the primary measure of the generosity of the EITC. 5 The phase-in rate and the maximum credit are reported for the federal program in the first six columns of Table 1 . The phase-in rate varies from zero prior to 1994 for families with no children to 30 percent in 1994 for families with two or more children; the maximum credit ranged from zero to more than $2,500 over 3 We have chosen to cut off the sample at this point for two reasons. First, we wanted to avoid potential complications associated with welfare reform. In particular, the introduction of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in 1996 and the corresponding proliferation of state experiments would likely make it difficult to distinguish EITC effects from those of other policies. Second, because of the CPS sample redesign, data from June 1994-August 1995 cannot be matched forward, so we cannot use the March 1995 -March 1996 When reporting descriptive statistics, we use weights designed to reduce bias associated with differential match rates. Specifically, we retained the family-specific sampling weight from the CPS and adjusted it by an estimate of the probability of a successful match derived from a logistic regression of matching success on the age of the family head and the initial income-to-needs ratio. The resulting weight is an estimate of the inverse of the probability of being in our matched sample of families. Although the regression estimates we report are unweighted, the results were not qualitatively affected by weighting. 5 In our sample, the correlation between the changes in the credit rate and the maximum credit is 0.98, which is not surprising since they are closely related by construction. When we estimated specifications using the change in the maximum credit in place of the change in the credit rate, the results were very similar to those shown here; selected results using this alternative measure are reported below. 23  25  28  28  28  28  28   30  30  ---5  5  5  5  5  4.4   30  30  ---25  25  25  25  25  20.8 The "percentage supplement" describes the state EITC credit rate as a percentage of the federal rate. Thus, for example, for Wisconsin in 1984 for a family with one child the effective rate is 13 percent (10 × (l + .3)). The credits for Maryland, Iowa, and Rhode Island are non-refundable. For Rhode Island, in 1992 and 1993 the credit rate changes slightly for incomes over $15,000; the table reports the initial credit rate, which is also used in the empirical analysis. We ignore two features of the federal EITC that prevailed from 1991-93: the young child credit, because it applies only to those with children under one year old; and the health insurance credit, as the ability of taxpayers to use this credit depends on other expenses that we cannot observe. Sources: Federal: Internal Revenue Service, "Individual Income Tax Return (form 1040 ------5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 -22.21 23.46 22.96 22.96 22.96 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5 the same period. In addition, during the sample period there were seven states that offered an EITC to low-income families (10 states did so in 1999). These state credits are, for the most part, defined as a simple percentage of the federal credit received by the family, and range from less than 5 percent to more than 70 percent, depending on the state, year, and number of children (Table 1) . Finally, while the federal program provides for a refundable credit, certain states offer only a non-refundable credit, and in some specifications we exclude these states from the sample or try to make credit rates comparable in the two types of states.
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In addition, in some specifications we include controls for business cycle conditions and for the presence of other changes in welfare programs. For the former, we use the unemployment rate for prime-age males in each state and year. For the latter, we use the maximum level of AFDC benefits (in real terms) available to a family of three, along with a variable measuring the fraction of months in each year for which a state received a waiver from federal AFDC requirements. 6
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES

Specifications
Our empirical strategy is to employ a specification that can be applied both to an analysis of the effects of the EITC on income-to-needs and to an analysis of the effects of a minimum wage policy. Partly for this reason, we use a reduced-form specification that limits the number of explanatory variables to exclude those that might be considered endogenous to these specific policies. We estimate some specifications using income-to-needs categories to construct the dependent variable, and some using income-to-needs directly. In the former case, the dependent variable is defined as the probability that a family moves from having an earned income-to-needs ratio (I/N) in the X 1 to Y 1 range in year one to a ratio in the X 2 to Y 2 range in year two. Using a linear probability model, our baseline specification can be expressed as:
where I{…} is an indicator variable for the specified outcome.
In addition to looking at evidence for transitions into and out of poverty (in terms of earned income), we use similar specifications to examine policy effects on changes in the income-to-needs ratios of poor families. In particular, we estimate corresponding specifications of the form:
generally for families with earnings below the poverty line in year one.
In equations [1] and [2], 'i' indexes families, 's' states, and 't' years; ∆ is the firstdifference operator. P ist is the policy under consideration (e.g., the state and/or federal EITC, or the real minimum wage). 7 U st is the prime-age adult male unemployment rate, which we include to capture differences in economic conditions across states; failing to control for economic conditions could generate spurious results if, for example, an improvement in the economy positively impacts poor families and also leads to more generous state EITCs as a result of budget surpluses. Z ist is a vector of other control variables, including the number of children under 18, defined using separate indicator variables for families with one child, two children, and three or more children. D s is a vector of state indicators, and D t is a vector of year indicators.
These empirical specifications can be interpreted as directly estimating the effects of changes in the EITC (or minimum wage) on transitions into or out of poverty, or on changes in income-to-needs. For example, a change in the policy (e.g., an increase in the credit rate) generates a one-time contemporaneous increase in the probability that poor families escape poverty, as some families decide that employment is worthwhile for some member or members. In this case, the state indicators capture persistent differences across states in transition rates or changes in income-to-needs; for example, different trends in poverty rates would imply state differences in transition rates. The year indicators capture aggregate changes in transition rates that may be driven by other factors, including other policy changes at the national level. On the other hand, to the extent that random shocks are always throwing some families into poverty, a higher level of the EITC could arguably be associated with, for example, permanently faster transitions out of poverty. However, entering the level of the EITC in equation [1] or [2] would imply that, unless for some reason a higher EITC also increased the rate of transition into poverty, this permanent increase in the transition rate out of poverty would eventually eliminate poverty altogether.
While on conceptual grounds, therefore, using the change in policy rather than the level as a regressor in the specifications for changes in poverty status or changes in income-to-needs is preferable, the data are also more consistent with this specification. To see this, in Appendix Table A1 we report unrestricted specifications using levels of the credit rate, and p-values for the tests of the restrictions implied by the change specification. 8 The statistical significance of the lagged value in many specifications argues against using only the contemporaneous level of the credit rate, and in no case were we able to reject the restriction implied by the specification using only the change in the credit rate; indeed for the state credit rate this restriction held remarkably closely. 9 An alternative and straightforward way to motivate the first-difference specifications in equations [1] and [2] , which also clarifies the interpretation of the coefficients, is to begin with specifications in which the level of the policy variable affects the level of income-to-needs, and which allow for unmeasured family characteristics that necessitate the differencing. In particular, the levels specifications corresponding to equations [1] and [2] are:
In these specifications, P, U, and Z are now entered in levels, so in equations [1] and [2] they are simply differenced. The year dummy variables also appear in levels; when they are differenced the resulting variables are equivalent to the original year dummy variables, which is why D t rather than ∆D t appears in equations [1] and [2] . It is assumed that, especially because of the limited information on 8 As explained below, we estimate specifications including the federal and state credit rates as separate variables, and specifications using a single combined credit rate. 9 We also estimated specifications in which we added the second lag (in levels) to the specification with current and lagged levels. The second lag was always insignificant. , with the only difference that we also condition on initial poverty status to study those family most likely affected by the EITC. 10 The parameters of interest in this study are of course β and β', which provide estimates of the effects of a change in the policy variable on transitions among income-to-need categories or changes in income-to-needs. For example, if the policy variable is the change in the EITC credit rate and X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 , and Y 2 are defined to measure transitions out of poverty, then β would tell us whether an increase in the credit rate results in a contemporaneous increase in the probability of families leaving poverty. Of course, given the above discussion regarding the link between the changes and levels specifications, we see that β equivalently measures the relationship between the level of the policy variable and the level of income-to-needs, poverty status, etc.
Identification
As noted earlier, we focus mainly on the EITC credit rate in the phase-in range. With the federal rate denoted r f and the state rate denoted r s (defined as zero in states without an EITC), the combined rate (r c ) is r c = r f ⋅ (1 + r s ). The federal EITC is calculated as r f multiplied by income (Y), over the phase-in range. The state EITC is then equal to r s multiplied by the federal EITC, or r s ⋅ (r f ⋅ Y) (see, e.g., Johnson and Lazere, 1999) . Equivalently, r f is the federal rate, and r s ⋅ r f the state rate. On a priori grounds, we should not restrict the effects of the federal and state rates to be the same. We therefore report results using the less restrictive specifications with separate federal and state parameters, but also report results for our main analyses using the combined rate.
For the federal program, the credit rate is defined as the proportion of earned income that can be applied as a credit to an eligible family's federal taxes over the phase-in range of the EITC; this variable thus varies across families based on the year in which they are in the sample and on the number of children in the family. For the state programs, the variable is the supplement used to augment the federal credit as specified in states that also have an EITC program; this variable also varies across years and with the number of dependent children in the family, but varies across states as well. Given that the state and year terms in the specifications we estimate absorb some of the variation in the data-including some of that in the EITC variables-it is useful to clarify how the policy effects are identified. In particu-10 If a variable does not have a constant coefficient in the levels specification, it does not appear only in differenced form in the first-differenced specification, but in differences and levels. We tested for this for the control variables, and found evidence that the levels of the unemployment rate and the children dummy variables also frequently had statistically significant coefficients, so we retained these variables in equations [1] and [2], although doing so has no impact on the conclusions. However, when we included the level of the EITC variables along with the changes, the estimated coefficients on the levels were not significantly different from zero; these findings are another way of specifying the tests of the change specification reported in Appendix  Table A1 . lar, the inclusion of the year indicators implies that the effect of the federal EITC is identified from differential changes in EITC parameters across families with different numbers of children. The inclusion of the state indicators implies that the effect of state EITCs is identified from within-state variation in EITC parameters. 11 The EITC is targeted at families with children under age 18, and thus in many specifications we further restrict the sample to such families. 12 Note that this choice, coupled with the information we have on state EITC supplements, leads to a different control group than that used by Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Eissa and Hoynes (1998) in their studies of the federal EITC. Specifically, those studies typically identify families most likely to be eligible for the EITC and compare the labor supply response in those families to the changes in labor supply in families not eligible for the EITC, such as those without children.
In contrast, our estimation procedure identifies the EITC effect from both variation in the federal EITC across families with one child or two or more children, and from within-state variation in state EITC parameters. The state-level approach allows us to go one step further in relaxing assumptions and still identifying the effects of the EITC. In particular, there may be changes in federal policies that have different effects on the incomes of families with and without children or with different numbers of children (e.g., Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or child care credits), or there may be other aggregate sources of change in family incomes that differentially affect families with different numbers of children. To allow for these differential sources of change in an unrestricted fashion, in some specifications we also include indicators for the number of children interacted with the year dummy variables. Once we add these interaction terms, the effect of the federal EITC is no longer identified, since it varies only with year and number of children. 13 Of course, because our sample period is also characterized by some state experimentation with policies affecting labor supply of single mothers or low-income families, it is possible that state-level variation in the EITC is correlated with other policy changes; these state policy changes are described in detail by Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999b) . Our empirical analysis addresses some of these changes. In particular, Medicaid expansions were in large part mandated by the federal government, and these mandated expansions are thus captured in the year effects, at least to the extent that these expansions had similar effects across states. In addition, in some specifications we include controls for AFDC waivers and minimum wages at the state level. Nonetheless, some legitimate concerns with relying on state-level EITC variation may remain. 14 This discussion is meant to highlight the fact that once we relax a number of restric-tions on the specification (in particular, the restriction of identical trends or time patterns across families with different numbers of children), only the effects of statelevel EITC variation are identified. Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations for the basic data used in the analysis. The first column shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of matched families in the CPS. Mean earned income is above $30 thousand per year in our sample, and the average income-toneeds ratio is a bit above three. However, 23 percent of families in our sample have an earned income-to-needs ratio below one, and another 8 percent are between one and 1.5. These poor and near-poor families are the intended targets of both the EITC and the minimum wage, and we would expect families with much higher income-to-needs ratios to be unaffected by the EITC. For these reasons, and to avoid outliers, we restrict the sample in most of the subsequent analysis to include only those families with income-to-needs ratios between zero and three. When the higher-income families (and a small number of families reporting negative incomes) are dropped from the sample (column (2)), mean earned income falls to less than $13 thousand and the average earned income-to-needs ratio is only slightly above one. In addition, nearly half of the families in this subsample have an earned income-to-needs ratio below one and about 60 percent are below 1.5. About 55 percent have children below age 18, which for most of the sample period is necessary to be eligible for the EITC. Finally, descriptive statistics for the subsample of families with children, on which we focus much of our empirical analysis, are shown in column (3) of Table 2 .
Descriptive Statistics
As can be seen in the middle of the table, transition rates across various parts of the earned income distribution are fairly high.
In each of the samples, more than 20 percent of families move out of poverty (based on earnings) each year, while about one-quarter of families with an initial earned income-to-needs ratio between one and 1.5 fall into poverty. These numbers are suggestive of a sizable amount of idiosyncratic change in family incomes, and provide a baseline with which to compare the EITC or minimum wage effects we report later in the paper.
Finally, the average federal EITC credit rate in our sample period was 14.8 percent for families with children, with the average size of an increase equalling 4.0 percentage points (using the numbers in column (2) of Table 2 ). The average state supplement for those states with an EITC program was 4.8 percent, with the average increase equal to 1.5 percentage points. The average real minimum wage was a bit less than $3 over our sample period, with the average real increase equal to $.20.
The Earned Income Tax Credit: Effects on Earned Income Table 3 presents estimates of the effects of the EITC from specifications corresponding to equations [1] and [2] . Each row of the table reports estimates for a particular subsample and dependent variable, with the first two columns reporting estimates for the specification using the separate federal credit rate (if identified) and state credit rate, and the third column reporting estimates for the specification using the combined rate. To aid in interpreting the reported coefficient estimates, the EITC variables have been standardized so that one-unit changes correspond to the average federal increase among observations for which an increase occurred (reported in Table 2 ). We use this average only, since we are trying to estimate the effect of a single policy, and the policy discussion revolves largely around the federal EITC; however, the scaling choice has no effect on the statistical inferences, and the estimates can easily be rescaled to correspond to average state changes, average combined changes, etc. Table 3 reports estimates of the effects of the EITC on the probability that a family with earned income below the poverty line in year one has an earned income level above the poverty line in .37 .36 .28
Panel I of
34,282
The sample is restricted to families in which the age of the family head is under 65. Real values are in 1982-84 dollars. Levels refer to year one in the matched CPS samples, and changes refer to the year one to year two change. The data cover matched March CPS files from 1986-87 to 1994-95. Standard deviations of some variables are reported in parentheses. Estimates are weighted by family weights adjusted for the probability of being matched. The income measure is total family eamings. Linear probability models are estimated using OLS. All specifications include first differences of year effects, interactions between state dummy variables and time trends, the prime-age male unemployment rate, and indicators for one, two, and three or more children, as well as the levels of the unemployment rate and children variables. Each row reports estimates from a single specification. In the third specification in each panel, first differences of year × children interactions are also included. Standard errors are robust to non-independence among state-year clusters, and to heteroscedasticity. Estimated effects are transformed to reflect the impact of the "average" change (.04) in the federal credit rate; see Table 2 . Columns (1 )-(2) come from one specification including the federal and state credit variables, and column (1′) comes from a second specification including only the combined credit variable. A '**' superscript indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level in a two-sided test, and a '*' superscript at the 10 percent level. year two. As can be seen in the top row of the panel, in column (1), the effect of the federal credit rate is negative, suggesting that increases in the EITC are associated with reductions in the rate of transition out of poverty, but the estimate is not statistically significant. One possible interpretation of a negative coefficient is that the EITC reduces work among low-income families, reflecting a large income effect on labor supply. Note, however, that because year effects are included in this specification, identification of the coefficient comes to a large extent from the correlation of changes in the federal EITC with differences in transition rates for families with no children and families with children. As noted above, because there are potentially other federal policies or aggregate changes that have different effects on the incomes of families with and without children, this equation may be subject to specification bias. We can get around some of the more obvious misspecifications by limiting the sample to families with children, thus identifying the coefficient from the differences in transition rates for families with one child and families with more than one child. But as indicated in the second row, the coefficient for this subsample is more negative, although with a considerably larger standard error. An alternative approach is to use stateyear variation in the EITC program as a means of identifying the effects of the EITC on earned income. 15 The estimated coefficients of the state EITC variables are shown in the second column. For the sample as a whole, the estimated state EITC effect on the probability of escaping poverty is positive but not statistically sig-nificant. However, when the sample is restricted to include only families with children, the estimated EITC effect is larger and becomes significant. This is, in fact, the sample for which one would expect to see sizable EITC effects, and, in our view, represents a cleaner experiment than can be achieved with the entire sample.
In the third row, we include year-children interaction terms in the specification to control for changes in other policies or economic changes at the aggregate level that vary with the number of children in each family. Upon including these interaction terms, only the effect of state EITCs is identified. Using this specification, the results are similar to those in the previous row, with the beneficial effects of the EITC on family earnings again showing up quite clearly. Moreover, the size of the coefficient estimate indicates that the effect of the EITC on poverty rates is far from trivial. The coefficient estimates indicate that an average (.04) increase in the credit rate increases the probability that a poor family's earnings rise above the poverty threshold by about .06. Since the mean of this transition probability is .21 (Table 2) , this is an increase of between one-quarter and one-third. Below, we provide a more thorough discussion of the magnitudes of this and other parameter estimates.
It is not clear why the incentives posed by the federal and state tax systems should differ. On the other hand, the evidence thus far points to different effects, although this may be attributable to empirical issues rather than theoretical ones. Regardless, for completeness we also report some of our basic results using the combined EITC rate, in column (1'). In the 15 As noted earlier, this is subject to some of the same concerns as the federal credit, in that there may be statespecific policies coming into play at the same time that have differing effects on incomes of families with different numbers of children. However, we suspect that this is less of a problem across states than it is for the federal EITC; moreover, the additional variation in the data allows us to include additional interactions to control for some of the possible effects of other sources of change. The drawback of this approach is that relatively few states have a separate EITC. This raises the possibility that the estimates are being driven by one or two states, an issue to which we return later in the paper.
first two rows, not surprisingly given the offsetting federal and state effects, the estimated coefficients of the combined rate are near zero and statistically insignificant.
In the third row, in which we continue to use the combined rate but in practice most of the identifying information comes from the state-level variation, the estimate again indicates a substantial effect of increased generosity of the EITC in lifting families above the poverty line. We delve into the EITC effects further in Panel II, focusing in particular on changes in income-to-needs for families with earnings below the poverty line in year one (equation [2] ). The results for this specification are quite similar to those in Panel I. Changes in the federal credit rate are estimated to reduce income-to-needs in both the full poor family sample and in the sample restricted to poor families with children, although the estimates are not statistically significant. With respect to the state credit, the EITC has a positive and significant effect on income-to-needs, with the size of the coefficients indicating that an average (.04) increase in the credit rate raises the income-to-needs ratio among poor families with children by around .07 on average, consistent with rather strong positive work incentive effects. 16 In Panel III, we use a similar set of specifications to examine the possibility that the EITC increases or reduces the probability that a family's earnings drop below the poverty line. In this set of results, we restrict the sample to families with earned income-to-needs ratios initially between one and 1.5. In our sample period, the income level at which families are first entitled to the maximum EITC benefit almost always occurs at an income level that is below the poverty line for families with one or more children. 17 Thus, for families near but generally above the poverty line, theory predicts that a higher EITC will reduce labor supply. Of course it is not the credit rate that is relevant to these families, but the maximum credit. Historically, however, the maximum credit and the credit rate have always moved in the same direction, so to keep things consistent with the earlier specifications, we continue to look at the credit rate as a proxy for the generosity of the EITC. 18 In general, there is little evidence that the EITC has any effect on the probability of a transition from near-poverty to poverty. For the federal credit, the coefficient estimates are in the direction of suggesting that the EITC increases the likelihood that families fall into poverty, although the estimated effects are again not statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on the state credit rate show almost no effect of the EITC on this transition probability. Finally, the estimated coefficients for the combined rate are also generally small and statistically insignificant.
Panel IV of the table reports the effects of the EITC on changes in earned incometo-needs ratios for this same set of nearpoor families. As can be seen in the first column, changes in the federal credit rate are estimated to have a negative effect on the income-to-needs ratio of near-poor families, with the estimated effect statis- 16 Because it is the inclusion of the year-children interactions that precludes estimating the effect of the federal EITC, we tested whether the inclusion of these interactions provided a better fit. The p-values from the tests of the restriction that only the federal credit rate is needed were .077 in Panel I, and .048 in Panel II, indicating that these interactions belong in the specifications. 17 For only a small handful of near-poor families (1.7 percent) did the poverty line in year two climb above the income at which the maximum credit is first paid, in year two, and by an average of only $160 (nominal). 18 The phase-out rate and the length of the credit plateau (i.e., the range of earnings over which the maximum credit applies) can also affect labor supply. Since 1987, increases in the credit rate have always been associated with increases in the phase-out rate, which should reduce labor supply. However, the length of the plateau has also increased with the credit rate, which could exert a slight positive influence on labor supply as families move to a higher kink point. In any event, we verified that the empirical results for the near-poor are similar using the change in the maximum credit as the policy variable.
tically significant for the sample as a whole but not for the subsample of families with children. The same holds for the estimated coefficient of the combined credit rate variable. In contrast, and consistent with the results in Panel III, changes in the state credit rate are estimated to have little effect on income-toneeds for this group of families. In sum, the evidence from the experiments reported in Table 3 points in somewhat different directions. For the federal credit rate, there is no evidence that the EITC increases earned income among poor families, a result that runs counter to the program's intent in regard to the lowestincome families. In contrast, the coefficients on the state credit rate (or the combined rate in the least restrictive specification) suggest strongly that the EITC raises earned income among poor families with children. And, perhaps more importantly, families eligible for the EITC are more likely to see their earnings rise above the poverty line when the credit increases in generosity. 19 In the other direction, there is some weak evidence from the federal experiment that a higher EITC leads to a reduction in earned income among families just above the poverty line, while the coefficients on the state EITC variable point to very little effect on these nearpoor families. Of course, all of these estimated coefficients understate the overall positive effects on income associated with the EITC. That is, the increase in total resources would be more pronounced if one considered the additional income received from the credit itself, which is not taken into account in this analysis. 20 To reveal the source of the differences in results for the federal and state experiments more clearly, Figures 1 and 2 present an analysis of the residuals from regressions of changes in the EITC credit rate and poverty status in year two (conditional on poverty in year one) on the auxiliary variables (including year effects) in the basic specification. In particular, the upper-left panel of Figure 1 shows the yearly mean residuals of the change in the federal EITC credit rate for families with one child, while the upper-middle panel shows the yearly mean residuals for the changes in the federal credit rate for families with two or more children. Comparing these two panels documents that the credit rate was increased by significantly different amounts for one-and two-child families in 1991 and 1994, with smaller differences evident in the intervening years (see Table  1 ); note that in all instances, the credit rate was increased by more for families with two or more children than for families with one child, resulting in the pattern of residuals shown in these panels.
As it is relative movements in the oneand two-child credit rates that identify the EITC effect in the federal experiment, the estimated effect can be gleaned from the correlation of these residuals with those in the bottom panel, which are the mean residuals from a regression of the poverty transition indicator on the auxiliary variables. Note, in particular, that the relative movements in the credit rate in 1991 are negatively correlated with the transition rate residuals in that year, while the large relative changes in credit rates in 1994 are associated with residuals in the middle of the range. As can be seen in the upperright panel, these patterns, combined with those for the remaining years, result in a negative and imprecisely estimated EITC effect from the federal experiment. Figure 2 , which shows similarly calculated residuals for the state treatment and control groups, indicates that there is significantly more variation in the relative movements in the credit rate in the state 19 For the specifications for transitions to above poverty-level earnings, and for changes in income-to-needs for families below poverty-level earnings, we tested the restrictions that the state and federal effects were equal. These were rejected at the 5 percent level. 20 Information on the actual credit received is not available in the CPS. experiment, which should help to identify the EITC effect more accurately. As indicated in the upper-right panel, the mean residuals for changes in the credit rate and the transitions out of poverty are positively correlated in the state experiment, producing a positive estimate of the effect of the EITC.
Labor Supply Effects
The differences in coefficient estimates associated with the federal and state EITC variables raise important questions about the appropriate interpretation of the results reported in Table 3 . To attempt to shed additional light on the results for income, we performed a complementary analysis of the effects of the federal and state EITC on employment and hours worked for our subsample of poor families with children. In general, the specifications are similar to those in Table 3 , with the exception that the dependent variable is either the probability that a family added an adult worker in the second year in the sample, or the change in total hours supplied by adult family members between the first and second years.
In Table 4 , we report estimates of the effects of the EITC on the probability that a family adds an adult worker or on total hours. In Panel I, we first (in sub-panel A) limit the sample to those families that had no adults working in year one. For the federal and state (as well as the combined) EITC variables, the effects of the EITC show through quite clearly. In particular, an average increase in the federal EITC is estimated to raise the probability of adding a worker by .11, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficients on the state credit rate show a similarly sized positive effect on employment, although it is estimated a bit less precisely. The fact that we find positive employment effects for both credit rates suggests that the earlier negative effects on income found for the federal EITC specifications may have been spurious, possibly owing to correlations between the EITC and other federal programs that affected the incomes of poor families in a way that masked the benefits of the EITC, but did not have a corresponding effect on measured labor supply behavior.
In sub-panel B, we restrict the sample to families that had one adult worker in year one to see if the employment effects extend to the working poor as well. In general, there is little evidence of any EITC effect for this subgroup. The estimated effect of the federal credit is positive, but imprecise. For the state credit rate, there is weak evidence of a negative effect of the EITC on the probability that such families add another worker to the labor market. Although this result is suggestive of a negative income effect on labor supply, the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant.
In Panel II, we examine the effects of the EITC on total hours worked by adult family members, splitting the sample into those families with no adult workers in year one and those families with at least one adult worker initially. As can be seen in sub-panel C, the federal EITC is estimated to have essentially no effect on hours worked by families with no adult workers initially. This result is at odds with the positive employment effects reported in the top panel, and again highlights the lack of consistency in the results obtained for the federal EITC experiment. In contrast, the estimated effects of the state credit rate show sizable positive effects on annual hours worked in families without an adult worker in the first year, statistically significant at the 10 percent level, which are consistent with the results for employment shown in the top panel. The size of the hours change seems large at first glance, but given that it is apparently associated with entry into the work force, it is consistent with the lumpy nature of employment. For families with an adult worker in year one (sub-panel D of Panel II), there is a positive EITC effect using the federal credit rate as the explanatory variable, but the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. The effect of increases in the state EITC credit rate, however, is to reduce hours worked for families that initially had at least one adult worker in year one. These results are the clearest indication we have of the negative effect of the EITC on labor supply found by some previous researchers (e.g., Eissa and Hoynes, 1998) .
In Table 5 , we attempt to match up our estimated effects of the EITC on income with the estimated labor supply effects reported in Table 4 . In particular, given that the effects on employment and hours worked are most pronounced for poor families with no adult workers in year one, we would expect to see the largest positive effects on earned income for these families. In contrast, the effects on earned income for poor families with an adult worker in year one should be minimal or even negative, as there is no evidence of a positive labor supply response for such families, and some evidence of an EITCinduced reduction in hours worked.
For poor families with no adult workers in year one, the results in Table 5 generally conform to these expectations, at least for the effects of the state credit rate. In particular, there are clear positive effects from the state credit rate on the probability that a poor family without an adult worker in year one becomes non-poor in year two (sub-panel A), as well as on the change in income-to-needs ratios (subpanel C) for such families. In contrast, the estimates show little effect of the federal EITC on the earned income of poor families with no adult worker in the first year, either in terms of the transition out of poverty or the income-to-needs ratio, despite the strong positive employment effect reported in Table 4 . Turning to poor families with one or more adult workers in year one, the results in sub-panel B indicate little effect from either the federal or state EITC on the transition to above poverty-level earnings, consistent with the lack of positive labor supply influences reported in Table 4 . As indicated in sub-panel D, when the dependent variable is specified as the change in income-to-needs, the coefficient estimates on the state EITC variable are positive, although not statistically significant. Nevertheless, these positive or non-negative earnings effects are difficult to square with the EITC-induced reduction in hours worked for these families estimated in Table 4 . In part, it appears that some large changes in income-to-needs within this group account for the positive estimates in sub-panel D. When we use the probability that a family experienced an increase in income-to-needs between year one and year two (Panel III), as a means of reducing the influence of extreme observations, the EITC coefficient estimates for the sample of poor families with no adult worker in year one are similar to those in Panel II (although less precisely estimated), and here the combined rate also points to significant beneficial effects. The coefficient estimates for the sample of poor families with an adult worker in year one become small and negative, although the failure to find stronger negative effects for this latter group remains puzzling.
Overall, in assessing the evidence from the federal and state experiments, it appears that the results based on the state credit rate form a more consistent whole, pointing to a positive labor supply effect for the same set of families for which we estimate a positive effect on earned income. In contrast, the results based on the federal credit rate are difficult to interpret in a consistent fashion, raising the possibility that our federal EITC estimates are being contaminated by spurious influences. Moreover, our results clearly identify the sources of the positive and negative effects from the EITC, at least for the state experiment. Increases in earnings mainly come about by inducing labor market entry among adults in families that initially had no adult workers. In contrast, poor families that already have an adult working reduce their hours in response to an increase in the credit rate. Taken alone, this latter result might suggest that such families are likely to be operating on the flat portion of the EITC schedule, so that the negative influence of higher income on labor supply is the dominant consideration. However, the absence in our results of a negative effect of increased generosity of the EITC on near-poor families poses somewhat of a puzzle in this regard because the families for whom these effects are identified are more likely to be in the phase-out range, where the negative labor supply effects should be stronger.
Assessing the Magnitudes of the Estimates
Our results suggest that the EITC has a beneficial effect in terms of lifting families above poverty-level earnings and on the incomes of poor families more generally. Moreover, we find that the higher earnings appear to be due to increased labor supply among families that initially do not have an adult worker. This subsection interprets the magnitudes that we estimate, and compares our estimates with those that exist in the literature. We focus on the estimated effects identified from variation in state EITCs, which provide the strongest evidence that the EITC reduces poverty.
We begin with the employment effects. The estimates in Panel I of Table 4 indicate that a .04 increase in the credit rate (the average increase in the federal credit rate in the sample) raises the probability of adding an adult worker by .139 for poor families without an adult worker, with little effect for families that already have an adult worker. To put this magnitude in perspective, the probability of adding an adult worker is .266 for the sample of families that are initially in this poor category with no adult workers, so our estimate implies a 52 percent increase in this probability. What does this estimate imply for the employment rate of adults among initially poor families? If we assume (a) no changes among those families that already have an adult worker (consistent with the results in Table 4 ), and (b) that the EITC does not lead families to reduce the number of adult workers (consistent with unreported results), then the implied change in the employment rate for poor families is obtained by multiplying our estimate by the proportion of initially poor families without an adult worker (.425), which yields a change in the employment rate of .059. 21 Our estimates similarly imply large effects on the probability of a transition from below to above poverty-level earnings. As indicated in Panel I of Table 3 , the aver-age .04 increase in the federal EITC credit rate increases the probability that an initially poor family escapes poverty by .067. Given that the mean escape rate for this subsample is .208, our estimate implies a one-time 32 percent increase in this escape rate. As the proportion of families with children below poverty-level earnings is .437, the implied reduction in the poverty rate is .067 × .437, or .029. Alternatively, with mean income-to-needs for this subsample equal to .312, the estimates in Panel II of Table 3 would imply a 23 percent increase in income-to-needs (.072/.312). 22 The large magnitudes of these estimated effects of the EITC raise questions about our identification strategy. In particular, the implied effects may appear unreasonable when used to infer the implications of the full increase in the federal credit rate over our sample period. For example, using the estimates to infer the effect of the .20 increase in the credit rate for families with two or more children over our sample period, one would predict a contemporaneous increase in the escape rate for initially poor families (in terms of earnings) from the sample mean of .208 to .543 (the .067 increase in the probability for a .04 change in the credit, multiplied by .20/.04), a more than 100 percent increase. We would note, however, that this prediction is based on a change in the policy variable that is far outside the range of the sample observations (as reported in Table 2 , the maximum credit rate increase in our sample is .105), and it is well-known that using regression estimates in this way is inappropriate. 23 21 It might be more sensible to consider the effect of an average increase in the credit rate at the state level, given that we identify the EITC effect off of state variation. In that case, the estimated effects would be reduced by a factor of .015/.04, so the effect on the employment rate would be an increase of .022. 22 As before, using the average state increase, the implied effects are smaller, with an implied reduction in the poverty rate of .010, and an implied increase in income-to-needs of 8.7 percent. 23 This is reflected in the fact that the variance of the prediction error for a given value of an exogenous variable is roughly proportional to the squared difference between that value and the sample mean. Another way to see this is to note that if we tried to estimate the relationship between employment transitions and the EITC non-parametrically, near the sample means where the observations are concentrated we would expect the non-parametric estimates to approximate the regression, and at the extremes the non-parametric relationship would be virtually impossible to identify.
The implied estimates might also appear large if there is a non-linearity that diminishes the effect of incremental changes in the EITC at higher levels. In results not reported in the tables, we reestimated the key specifications for the state credit rate adding a quadratic term. The coefficients were consistent with a diminishing effect (i.e., a negative coefficient on the squared term) for the employment and change in income-to-needs specifications. 24 In all cases, the implied effects of implementing the average federal EITC increase were very similar to those in the linear specification. But for these specifications, the absolute magnitude of the quadratic term was sufficiently large that EITC effects reached their maximum for changes in the credit rate in the .04 to .06 range. Of course, we do not literally expect a higher EITC to have a smaller effect on levels than a lower EITC, at least in the phase-in range, but the curvature may be largely identified from sample observations with much smaller credit rate changes.
Finally, our study relies on state-level EITC variation to identify the EITC's effects, and it is possible that policy or other changes at the state level are generating spuriously large estimates of these effects. As documented in Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999b) , most of the changes in state policies (regarding welfare, child care, training, etc.) began in earnest in 1991. As another way of assessing whether our state EITC results are amplified because they reflect spurious changes in other policies at the state level, we re-estimated the specifications for transitions to above poverty-level earnings and for changes in in-come-to-needs for two subperiods, one ending in 1990, and the other beginning in 1991 (with these dates corresponding to year two income). We think these results should be interpreted cautiously, because the number of observations that identify the state EITC effect is not large even in the full sample. Nonetheless, it is of some interest that the evidence of beneficial effects on poor families was considerably stronger in the early sample period, rather than the later one. Since the other state-level policy changes occurred in the later period, this suggests that if anything these latter changes mask, rather than exacerbate, the estimated effects of variation in state EITCs. 25 Despite all of these considerations, the implied effects are still sufficiently large to warrant a comparison with existing evidence in the literature. There are no studies that are directly comparable to ours-as they use different samples, different identification strategies, etc.-but there are a few studies in the literature that we can use to establish the "ball park" in which we might reasonably expect our estimates to fall. These are summarized in Table 6 .
As indicated in Panel I (sub-panel A) of the table, Eissa and Leibman (1996) conduct a straightforward difference-in-difference analysis of the 1986 expansion in the federal EITC, for single women with children (using single women without children as a control group). They find that a .033 increase in the credit rate raised the employment rate for this group by .028 for the full sample, and by .036 for those with predicted earnings in the range of eligibility for the EITC. 26 Table 3 ), they are .107 (.037) and -.033 (.018). 25 Alternatively, it is possible that state-level variation in the EITC has particularly large effects, but there is no obvious reason why this should be the case. 26 We arrive at .033 by averaging credit rates for 1984-86 and 1988-90, the periods covered by the data they study from before and after the 1986 expansion. different sample from ours, as it is restricted to women only and is not restricted to those with low earnings. In addition, the source of the identifying variation is different. Nonetheless, as explained in the table, if we rescale our estimated employment effect to correspond to an equivalent increase in the credit rate, the implied increase in the employment rate is .049. This is somewhat larger than Eissa and Leibman's estimated increase, but qualitatively similar.
The 1986 expansion also entailed other changes increasing the value of the EITCmost importantly an increase in the maximum income to which the phase-in rate applied-as well as other tax changes. Eissa and Liebman argue that their evidence is consistent with the changes in employment being driven by the expansion of the EITC. Nonetheless, the changes in the EITC other than the increased phasein rate could imply that we somewhat understate our implied effects relative to Eissa and Leibman (1996 ): Their sample: March CPS, 1985 -87, 1989 , single women aged 16-44, not in school.
I. Employment Effects
A. Comparison with
Estimated effects: .033 increase in federal phase-in rate in 1986 increased employment rate of single women with children relative to those without children by .028 (Table III) , or .036 (Table IV) if we focus on those eligible for EITC.
Our estimates: Increase in probability that initially poor family without an adult worker adds an adult worker is .139. Scaled to .033 increase in EITC implies increase in probability of .115. Multiplied by proportion of initially poor families without adult worker (.425) implies increase in employment rate of .049 (.115 × .425) . Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999b) :
B. Comparison with
Their sample: March CPS, 1985-97, single mothers aged 19-44, not in school.
Estimated effects for their most comparable sample: $1,000 ($1996) increase in tax credit increases employment probability by .086 for high school dropouts, .052 for those with 12 or fewer years of schooling (weighted average of their Table 4 
estimates).
Our estimates: Credit rate increase to yield equivalent percentage change in income for those initially poor is .055 ($1,000/{average income for working single mothers of $18,165}) (their Appendix Table 2 ). Increase in probability that initially poor family without an adult worker adds an adult worker is .139. Scaled to .055 increase in EITC implies increase in probability of .191. Multiplied by proportion of initially poor families without adult worker (.425) implies increase in employment rate of .081.
II. Effects on Earned Income
Comparison with Eissa and Hoynes (1998) :
Their sample: March CPS, 1984-96, married couples with children, women with fewer than 12 years of schooling.
Estimated effects for their most comparable sample: Simulated effect of 1993 expansion of EITC on earnings of couples in phase-in range, based on labor supply and participation. $790 ($1994) increase in tax credit raises family earnings by $686 (from participation and labor supply effects, Tables 7a and 10a ). Relative to average earned income of initially poor families in our data of $6,144 ($1994), implies an 11.2 percent increase in earned income.
Our estimates: Credit rate increase to yield equivalent income change for those initially poor is .129 ($790/{average income of initially poor of $6,144 ($1994)}). Increase in income-to-needs is .072. Scaled to .129 increase in EITC implies increase in income-to-needs of .232, or assuming no change in needs a 23.2 percent increase in income. Vol. 54 no. 2 (June 2001) pp. 281-318 theirs. 27 On the other hand, our higher estimated effect may be partially due to sample differences; we would speculate that the focus on women, without the restriction to those earning low incomes, might lead to lower employment effects, because single mothers often face other constraints on labor supply (e.g., child care availability), and because some women in the sample may have earned income levels well beyond the phase-in range of the EITC. Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999b) estimate the effects of the EITC on employment of single mothers, based on a single variable that captures changes in taxes owed as well as potential tax credits. 28 They do not focus on low-income women, but do report results for high school dropouts and those with 12 years of schooling. We consider the estimates based on the dropouts or a weighted average of dropouts and those with 12 years of schooling as most comparable to our results. For these women, Meyer and Rosenbaum estimate that a $1,000 increase (in 1996 dollars) in the tax credit raises the employment probability by .086 (dropouts) or .052 (high school or less). 29 As shown in the table, we construct a comparable estimate by scaling our estimates by a credit rate increase that would lead to an equivalent credit increase for the average family with earnings initially be-low the poverty line. 30 This leads to a predicted increase in the employment rate of .081, towards the higher end of their range of estimates.
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Finally, Eissa and Hoynes (1998) report effects on earned income for married couples (with women with fewer than 12 years of schooling) in the EITC phase-in range, based on a combination of estimated employment and hours equations, and a model for simulating taxes and credits. In the results they report, a $790 increase in the tax credit (1994 dollars) generates an increase in family earnings of $686, implying an 11.2 percent increase in earned income relative to the average earned income of initially poor families in our data set. 31 An equivalent credit rate increase in our sample, based on our estimates, generates an increase in earned income of 23.2 percent. 32 In this case, our estimates are clearly larger than theirs, especially if we believe that the labor supply response of single mothers is more constrained, as their sample consists of married couples, while our consists of any type of family.
In sum, although our estimated EITC effects do not seem way out of line with existing estimates, their larger magnitudes might nonetheless raise some caution flags with respect to drawing strong policy conclusions. Coupled with the differences between our estimated state and 27 Indeed, the data are consistent with this. If we estimate the model in the second row of Panel A of Table 4 using the maximum EITC credit, which encompasses information on the phase-in rate and the maximum income over which it applies, we obtain an estimated coefficient (standard error) of .086 (.050). Since the average real increase in the federal maximum credit in the sample period was $141.79, and the real increase entailed by the 1986 expansion was $235.27, we scale up this effect (rather than down, as in Panel A of Table 6) , and arrive at an implied increase in the employment rate of .061 (.086 × (235.27/141.79) × .425), compared with .049 using the phase-in rate. 28 They study hours as well. 29 To get estimates most comparable to ours, we use their results based on the March CPS data. 30 In their data, the $1,000 increase is for individuals whose average earnings if working are $18,165. Since the EITC generates equal percentage increases in income (in the phase-in range), we use a credit rate increase that yields the same (5.5 percent) increase in income (earnings plus the credit) at this level of earnings. 31 The increased labor supply for married couples in the phase-in range contrasts with the overall negative labor supply effects that Eissa and Hoynes estimate, discussed earlier. 32 Eissa and Hoynes do not report average earnings of the couples in the phase-in range. We therefore use average earnings of initially poor families in our data set. Using a different base would leave the ratio of the percentage changes implied by their estimates and ours unchanged.
federal effects, and the difficulty of establishing a firm consensus based on what is so far a relatively small literature using a variety of different approaches, perhaps the safest conclusion is that we have a rather good idea of the direction of the effects, but that more precise inferences regarding their magnitudes await further research. In the next subsection we carry out some additional checks on our results that assess their robustness. In so doing we provide further evidence on whether they are spurious, by asking whether they are sensitive to the inclusion of other state-level policy changes as controls, the exclusion of the potentially most influential observations, and alternative measures of EITC generosity.
Robustness and Validity Checks
In Table 7 we lower the threshold across which we measure transitions, to test the sensitivity of our results to the rather arbitrary (but policy-relevant) choice of the poverty line. 33 There are two reasons to look at evidence for earned income-toneeds thresholds below one. First, given our findings that the EITC effects are largest for families initially without an adult worker (and thus little if any earned income), we might expect to see stronger effects when we set the threshold at a lower level. For example, a family in which a worker enters the labor market at a minimum wage job is unlikely to attain poverty-level earnings in the subsequent year. In this case, our choice of the poverty line for the earned income-toneeds cutoff in previous specifications would miss some of the beneficial effects of the EITC. Second, as already noted, we do not measure all components of income used to classify families as poor or nonpoor, so that families attaining a lower fraction of the poverty threshold in terms of earnings alone might nonetheless escape poverty.
The results in the table are suggestive of only modest sensitivity to the choice of threshold. In particular, looking at families with no adult worker in year one (Panel B), the state EITC effects are strongest when the threshold is set at .3, indicating that some families' earned incometo-needs are lifted by the EITC, although not to a ratio above the poverty line. This suggests that our previous estimates focusing on the transition out of poverty may understate the beneficial effects of the EITC on earnings of low-income families. Of course, some families seem to be helped even more by the EITC, as is indicated by the positive coefficients for all of the income thresholds in the table. Consistent with the results reported in Table  5 , the estimated effect of the federal EITC is small and negative for poor families with no adult worker in year one, a result that is insensitive to the choice of threshold. Similarly, for poor families with an adult worker in year one, our earlier finding of essentially no effect of the federal or state EITC on poverty transitions is not affected by the choice of income-to-needs threshold.
In Table 8 , we repeat the analysis in Table 3 for both the effects of the EITC on transitions to above poverty-level earnings and on changes in income-to-needs, introducing a variety of other differences in the sample or specification. In Panels A and B, we vary our treatment of states offering only non-refundable tax credits at the state level, on the grounds that refundability is often touted as a major feature contributing to the value of the program to low-income families. In particular, if refundability is important to a family's labor supply decisions, the estimated EITC effects should be larger for the lowest-income families once the credit .070** (.030)
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.082** (.030) for states without refundable credits is downgraded or when these states are dropped. When the states with non-refundable credits are excluded from the sample (Panel A), the estimated effects of the state EITC on transitions out of poverty are smaller than the baseline results, rather than larger, and no longer statistically significant. 34 However, the effect of the state EITC on the change in income-to-needs is still significant when these states are excluded and is nearly identical to the baseline results. As an alternative, we attempt to equate the effective rate of re-fundable and non-refundable credits, setting the credit rate for the latter equal to one-fifth of the statutory rate. The choice of one-fifth as the equivalent rate for nonrefundable credits is based on the "tradeoff" between refundable and non-refundable rates established in Maryland in 1998, when taxpayers were offered an option of a 50 percent non-refundable supplement or a 10 percent refundable supplement. However, we obtain essentially the same results when we do this, as reported in Panel B. In no case is there any meaningful change in the federal or state EITC coefficient estimates. Table 3 for details. The experiment in Panel B is based on the "tradeoff" between refundable and non-refundable rates established in Maryland in 1998, when taxpayers were offered an option of a 50 percent non-refundable supplement, or a 10 percent refundable supplement. In Panel D, the waivers variable is defined based on the fraction of the year in which waivers from federal rules for state experimentation were in effect; the change is included. In Panel E, we scale by the average change in the federal maximum credit ($141.79, in real terms) in years when it changed, just as we treat the credit rate in the preceding tables. In Panel I, we restrict attention to 1993 and earlier because in that period there was no EITC for families with no children. In Panel J, the estimated coefficient for the federal experiment suggested a stronger positive effect when families without children were excluded, but the results for the state experiment were very similar.
In Panels C and D, we alter the set of control variables used in the analysis. In Panel C we drop the change in the unemployment rate, on the grounds that it is potentially endogenous to changes in the EITC (if, for example, the EITC raises household spending). The drawback to this change in specification is the absence of controls for time-varying state labor market influences on poverty rates. In any event, there is little change in any of the EITC parameter estimates when the unemployment rate is omitted, perhaps because much of the variation in economic conditions is captured by the state and year effects. In Panel D, we add controls for changes in real AFDC benefits for a family of three, and the extent to which state welfare laws could differ from federal regulations (federal waivers). The results are very similar when these controls are added, suggesting that the specifications using the state credit rate are not particularly susceptible to biases associated with the omission of other state policies.
In Panel E, we use changes in the maximum credit rather than the phase-in rate as the EITC policy variable. The rationale for this alternative is that the change in the phase-in rate does not always provide a complete description of changes in the EITC program. In particular, using the maximum credit also captures changes in the phase-in range, and thus may pick up some variation omitted by the credit rate variable. As it turns out-perhaps not surprisingly given that the changes in the maximum credit and the phase-in rate are very highly correlated in our samplesubstituting the change in the maximum credit as the EITC policy variable has little qualitative effect on the results. In particular, for the federal EITC, the coefficients are still negative and insignificant. For the state EITC, the estimated effect is somewhat smaller than the baseline results (as before, for average policy changes), but the coefficients continue to indicate posi-tive and statistically significant effects of the EITC on both the probability of transitions out of poverty and on changes in income-to-needs.
The next three panels investigate the effects of using alternative treatment and control groups in the analysis. In Panel F, we limit the control group to states that have a geographical border with the states that have their own EITC program. The idea here is that bordering states may be more similar in other respects to the EITC states and thus form a better control group. For the state EITC phase-in rate, there is little change in the coefficient estimates. For the federal EITC, the estimated effect is still negative, but is substantially larger than in the baseline, and is statistically significant.
In Panels G and H, we omit from the sample the states with the largest changes in credit rates, to test the sensitivity of the estimated EITC effects to these policy outliers. In Panel G, we drop all observations on families from Wisconsin with three or more children, for whom the phase-in rate was very high beginning in 1989. In Panel H, we omit observations from Maryland, which introduced a large non-refundable credit in 1987. In neither case does the change in sample have much effect on either the federal or state EITC coefficient estimates. There were also sizable expansions in Medicaid in Wisconsin in both 1988 and 1992, which might confound the estimated effects of the EITC. However, the results were qualitatively similar omitting the Wisconsin observations altogether, statistically significant at the 10 percent level for transitions out of poverty, and at the 5 percent level for changes in income-to-needs.
In addition, in results not reported in the table, we tried dropping each of the other "treatment" states one at a time. The results were quite robust. For example, for the estimated effect of the state EITC on the probability of a transition to above poverty-level earnings, the range of esti-mates was .061 to .087, and the coefficients were always significant at the 5 percent level (with the exception noted above). For the estimated effect on the change in income-to-needs, the range of the estimates was .066 to .079, always significant at the 5 percent level. 35 Thus, if there are changes in state policies or other state-level factors that are spuriously generating our estimated EITC effects, the pattern of their correlation with state EITC changes is remarkably stable across states.
Finally, in Panels I and J, we use another approach to examine the possibility that the results we report for the EITC in earlier tables are spurious, by looking for positive EITC effects in samples of families not eligible to participate in the program. In Panel I, we apply our methodology to families that have earned incometo-needs ratios between zero and three, but that do not have any children and thus would not be eligible for the EITC prior to 1994. In particular, we estimate specifications like those in Table 3 for this sample of currently childless families, but attach the EITC parameters that would have been relevant to them if they had three or more children. If the effects we have attributed to the EITC were actually associated with an omitted variable that also boosted earned income and that was correlated with the EITC, then we might expect to see spurious "EITC effects" for this ineligible population as well. For the state EITC variable (in this experiment the federal effects are not identified), the estimated coefficients are very small and insignificant. In Panel J, we perform older baseline analysis on a sample of families with income-to-needs between three and ten, well above the qualifying cut-off for the EITC. Again, the resulting coefficient estimates are small and insignificant, indicating no effect of the EITC on this group of families. As we should not expect to see EITC effects for these particular samples, these results add credence to our interpretation of the results in Table 3 as reflecting causal effects of the EITC.
The EITC Versus the Minimum Wage
In Table 9 , we report estimates from specifications that include both the EITC variables and the minimum wage, to see if conditioning on real minimum wage changes alters the estimated EITC effects on earned income, and to provide a more direct contrast of the effects of the alternative policies for the same population (while keeping in mind the possible reservations about our estimated magnitudes of EITC effects discussed earlier). As it turns out, there is a relatively low correlation coefficient (less than .15) between changes in minimum wages and changes in EITC parameters, and thus adding the minimum wage changes to the specification has little effect on the estimates of the EITC effects. As already noted, we scale the EITC variables to measure the effects of average policy increases in the federal credit rate over the sample period. Similarly, we scale the minimum wage variable to measure the effects of average real increases in the minimum wage over the same period. 36 In Panel I, we report estimates of the effects of the two policies on the probability of a transition from below poverty to above poverty-level earnings. 37 Looking 35 The estimated coefficients of the federal EITC variable were also robust, with a range of -.043 to -.058 for the transition equation, and -.047 to -.076 for the income-to-needs specification, with none of the estimates statistically significant. 36 Whether we use average federal increases only or federal and state increases is irrelevant, as the former is .209, and the latter .204. (These are real increases in 1982-84 dollars; see Table 2 .) 37 Consistent with evidence in Neumark and Wascher (1997) and Neumark, et. al. (1998) , we include contemporaneous and lagged minimum wage changes. The coefficient on each of these variables is insensitive to the exclusion of the other. Table 3 . Estimated effects are transformed to reflect the impact of the "average" increase in the federal credit rate (.040) or the real federal minimum wage in 1982-84 dollars (.209); see Table 2 . The p-values reported in column (5) are for the hypothesis that the minimum wage coefficients sum to zero. first at the results for the full sample (subpanel A), as can be seen in the first row, for the entire sample of poor families we again find no evidence that the federal EITC raises earned income-to-needs, and only weak evidence that the state EITC has a positive effect. In addition, the minimum wage is estimated to have essentially no effect on this transition. 38 When the sample is restricted to families with children, however, both the state EITC and the minimum wage are estimated to have a positive impact. The EITC effect is much larger than the minimum wage effect, pointing to the greater effectiveness of the EITC in raising earnings, at least for the magnitudes of changes in policy enacted during our sample period. 39 The remainder of Panel I reports results conditioning on the presence of an adult worker in the family initially, which, as documented in earlier tables, was strongly associated with the effects of the EITC. In sub-panel B, we report results for families with no adult worker in year one. As before, we find stronger positive effects of the EITC on the probability of a transition to above poverty-level earnings. In contrast, the minimum wage effects are a bit weaker, with the contemporaneous effect, in particular, becoming smaller and statistically insignificant. In sub-panel C, we report estimates for families with at least one adult worker in year one. Here there are no significant positive effects of the EITC, but the positive effects of the minimum wage are larger. This evidence is consistent with the EITC doing much more to help poor families with no adult worker initially, while the benefits of the minimum wage fall more strongly on poor families that already have an adult worker. 40 In Panel II, we repeat the analysis using changes in income-to-needs as the dependent variable. Qualitatively, the results are similar to those in Panel I. The federal EITC has either a negative or no discernible effect on income-to-needs ratios among poor families; the state EITC has a positive effect on income-to-needs, especially for the subsample of poor families with children; and the minimum wage has a modest positive effect on earnings of poor families with children, but no effect for the sample of poor families as a whole. Similarly, disaggregating by the presence of adult workers in the initial year again reveals that the benefits of the EITC fall largely on families with no adult workers initially, while the minimum wage benefits families that already have adult workers.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the earned income tax credit in raising the earnings of poor and low-income families. In particular, we move beyond the simulation approach commonly used in the literature and provide reducedform estimates using two-year panels of families derived from matched CPS files, focusing on the probability that an initially poor family sees its earned income rise above the poverty line, and on the changes 38 This is largely consistent with the evidence reported in Neumark and Wascher (1997) . In that paper, we find that minimum wages have a slight positive effect on the probability of escaping poverty (defined in terms of total income), and a larger positive effect on the probability of slipping into poverty. 39 One could contemplate policy changes of very different magnitudes, and in principle come up with a comparison as favorable to one policy or the other as one would like. However, the dangers of extrapolating regression results well beyond the range of changes in the exogenous variables that occur in the sample are well known, and it is plausible that the effects of policy changes of very different magnitudes differ substantially. For example, many of those who argue that minimum wage increases do not reduce employment of low-wage workers qualify their conclusions to refer only to small changes in the minimum wage. 40 The latter result is not surprising. While job loss from minimum wage increases may entail some "losers," the "winners" are more likely to be those with jobs already.
in income-to-needs that poor families experience, as a result of increased generosity of the EITC. The results of our estimation strategy hinge on the nature of the experiment we perform. When we look at the federal EITC, identifying its effects from differences in the credit rate by family size, the evidence suggests that the EITC reduces the probability that a poor family escapes poverty, but the estimated effects are not statistically significant. In contrast, when we focus on state credit rates, using state variation to identify the EITC effects, the evidence suggests that the EITC helps families rise above poverty-level earnings. Neither experiment points to any effect of the EITC on families initially above the poverty line, suggesting that the EITC is well targeted. We find a similar pattern of results when we use changes in income-to-needs as the dependent variable. A conservative interpretation of these results is that the estimated beneficial effects of state EITCs, coupled with the lack of any statistically significant evidence of negative effects of the federal EITC, suggest that increasing the generosity of the EITC does not have adverse effects on the earnings of low-income families that would offset the increased transfers entailed by a higher EITC. An alternative interpretation more favorable to the EITC is that it exerts a positive work incentive, leading to higher earnings that complement the direct benefits from the tax credit itself.
The difference between the estimated effects on earned income using the federal or state credit rate is explored further by examining the effects of the EITC on family labor supply. In general, the results based on the state credit rate form a more consistent whole, pointing to a positive labor supply effect for the same families for which we estimate a positive effect on earned income. In contrast, the results based on the federal credit rate are difficult to interpret in a consistent fashion, raising the possibility that our federal EITC estimates are being contaminated by spurious influences, perhaps stemming from the limited amount of variation that identifies the federal experiment and/or underlying differences in trends for families of different sizes. In particular, one possibility is that other federal policies are changing over this period in a way that limits the extent to which variation in the number of children in a family can identify the EITC effect.
Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999a) provide a detailed discussion of a wide array of such policy changes, in particular those aimed at increasing work incentives for single mothers. These include changes in income taxes, AFDC and Food Stamp benefits, Medicaid, training programs, child care programs, and private health insurance. They also provide rather compelling evidence that-as a whole-the timeseries pattern of changes in work among single mothers is consistent with these policy changes having sharply boosted employment of single mothers. To the extent that such policy changes induce different patterns of employment change in families with and without children, as well as in families with different numbers of children, isolating the effects of the EITC may require using specifications that allow for different trends over time for families with different numbers of children (i.e., year × children interactions). 41 As only the state EITC experiment is identified in such specifications, this possibility is an argument in favor of our state experiment for estimating the effects of the EITC on earnings, and is consistent with our evidence that only the state EITCs 41 Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999b) carry out a multivariate analysis of the effects of the EITC (and income tax rates) on the labor supply of single women, in light of other accompanying policy changes. Echoing our concerns, they add interactions between years and number of children to their specifications. yield a set of results more broadly in accordance with theoretical predictions. On the other hand, some of these policy changes occurred at the state level, rather than the federal level, raising the possibility that our state EITC experimentwhile generating some labor supply results more consistent with theoretical predictions-is spuriously attributing to the EITC the effects of other policy changes. In other words, the state experiment is not immune from this same criticism. We have taken numerous steps to explore whether the state EITC effects are likely to be spurious-including control variables for some policy changes, testing for the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of particular states or time periods, estimation of labor supply effects, comparisons to existing estimates, etc.-generally concluding that they are not. Nonetheless, additional work on the effects of federal and state EITCs is warranted. The labor supply estimates we report also indicate more clearly the channels through which the effects of the EITC (as identified from the state variation) operate. In particular, the evidence indicates that the EITC raises earnings by inducing labor market entry among families that initially do not have any adults in the work force. In contrast, we find some evidence that increasing the EITC credit rate reduces hours among poor families that already have a working adult, possibly offsetting the additional (post-tax) income associated with the more generous credit.
Finally, our results (again, based on the state-level variation) suggest that for the range of policy changes that have been typical in recent years, the EITC is more beneficial to poor families than is the minimum wage. The minimum wage appears to have some positive effect on the earnings of poor families with children. Our estimates of the effects of the EITC, however, are much larger than for the minimum wage. Our evidence also highlights the different types of families that the al-ternative policies are likely to benefit, indicating that a higher minimum wage helps families with adults in the work force, while increased generosity of the EITC primarily benefits families that initially have no adult workers, an empirical result that follows quite expectedly from the theoretical prediction that the EITC will encourage labor market entry.
The fact that the EITC appears to increase earnings is a particularly strong statement in favor of such a policy. For one thing, our analysis does not include the income benefits of the tax credit itself, and thus we understate the overall effects of the EITC on the total income of eligible families. Moreover, if the EITC were simply to increase income rather than earnings, it would be just another tax and transfer scheme, similar to those that have consistently disappointed policy makers in the past. In this sense, evidence that the EITC raises labor market participation and earnings among the poorest families suggests that it may also have a positive influence by encouraging economic selfsufficiency among the poor, which would enhance its effectiveness as a policy for fighting poverty, and, we suspect, its political support. .676
APPENDIX
See notes to Table 3 . Estimates are reported for families with children only, corresponding to the second specification in the indicated panels of Table 3 ; the restricted specifications are those reported in Table 3 . In levels specifications, estimated effects are transformed to reflect the impact of the "average" change (.04) in the federal credit rate, so that the differenced variables correspond to Table 3; see Table 2 . Columns (l)-(6) come from one specification including the federal and state federal credit variables, and columns (l′)-(3′) come from a second specification including only the combined credit variable. A '**' superscript indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level in a two-sided test, and a '*' superscript at the 10 percent level.
